1H 2017 Quick Links, Part 5 (Advertising, Contracts)

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Advertising

* David A. Hyman et al, Going Native: Can Consumers Recognize Native Advertising? Does It Matter?, 19 Yale J.L. & Tech. 77 (2017): “We tested sixteen examples of native advertising. For fifteen of the sixteen examples, fewer than 50% of respondents knew that native ads were paid content. Averaged across all sixteen examples, only 38% of respondents knew that native ads were paid content.”

* NY Times: While retailers and brands may feel like they have no choice but to spend on search advertising, many do so willingly because it works. Kristi Argyilan, a senior vice president of marketing at Target, said search advertising was accounting for a larger portion of her digital spending because the ads were “becoming so useful” and more relevant.

* Reuters: Burger King debuts Whopper ad that triggers Google Home devices

* Adweek: 1 in 3 Internet Users Has Made a Purchase Based on Sponsored Content. Reminder: Most people don’t care if content is sponsored as long as it’s useful and high quality

* Marketing Land: Study: Gen Z more discriminating, more advertising-resistant than Gen X or Y

* Adweek: “In an era of increased media fragmentation, brands are finding that the best way to market their products is to create entertainment that consumers actively seek out,” said Maude Standish, vp of programming strategy of Fullscreen. “This is particularly true when marketing to Gen Z, who grew up with the internet and are not only demanding that all brands entertain them, but also that entertainment shifts to behave like a friend. It’s also why influencers are so effective in selling to this generation.”

* FTC: Economic Analysis of Hotel Resort Fees. The fact that the FTC is doing nothing about resort fees is ridiculous.

* Washington Post: ‘It wasn’t even a question’: The simple calculation for pulling advertising off Breitbart

* Daily Mail Online: Are these the biggest food lies ever? Hilarious photos reveal the misleading packaging that’s led to some VERY disappointed (and hungry) customers

* NY Times: A Bank Had Ads on 400,000 Sites. Then Just 5,000. Same Results.

* WSJ: Online Publishers Try Reducing Ads to Boost Revenue

* FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose RelationshipThe Recorder: Who Got Those Social ‘Influencer’ Letters From the FTC? Read the Full List. Prior blog post.

* Venable: Operation Full Disclosure Part 2: FTC Compliance Sweep—Influencing the Use of Influencers. Law.com: How companies responded.

* Wired: What Really Happens Inside a PR Crisis War Room

* Jalopnik: Here’s How Much Businesses Pay To Get On Those Big Blue Exit Signs

Contracts

* Artifex Software v. Hancom, 3:16-cv-06982-JSC (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2017): “Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on the unsigned GNU GPL fails to plausibly demonstrate mutual assent, that is, the existence of a contract. Not so. The GNU GPL, which is attached to the complaint, provides that the Ghostscript user agrees to its terms if the user does not obtain a commercial license. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used Ghostscript, did not obtain a commercial license, and represented publicly that its use of Ghostscript was licensed under the GNL GPU. These allegations sufficiently plead the existence of a contract.”

* Oren Bar-Gill et al, “Drawing False Inferences from Mandated Disclosures.”  Abstract:

Disclosure mandates are pervasive. Though designed to inform consumers, such mandates may lead consumers to draw false inferences – for example, that a product is harmful when it is not. When deciding to require disclosure of an ingredient in or characteristic of a product, regulators may be motivated by evidence that the ingredient or characteristic is harmful to consumers. But they may also be motivated by a belief that consumers have a right to know what they are buying or by interest-group pressure. Consumers who misperceive the regulator’s true motive, or mix of motives, will draw false inferences from the mandated disclosure. If consumers think that the disclosure is motivated by evidence of harm, when in fact it is motivated by a belief in a right-to-know or by interest-group pressure, then they will be inefficiently deterred from purchasing the product. We analyze this general concern about disclosure mandates. We also offer survey evidence demonstrating that the risk of false inferences is serious and real. Our framework has implications for the ongoing debate over the labeling of food with genetically modified organisms (GMOs); it suggests that the relevant labels might prove misleading to some or many consumers, producing a potentially serious welfare loss. Under prevailing executive orders, regulators must consider that loss and if feasible, quantify it.

* Jane Bambauer et al, A Bad Education, Univ. of Ill. L. Rev.:

Mandated-disclosure laws achieve their regulatory goals by educating the public about latent attributes of a product or service. At their best, they improve the accuracy of consumers’ cost-benefit analyses compared to a world without disclosure and inspire firms to reduce unnecessary risks. When mandated disclosures, however, do not improve cost-benefit assessments–when they are useless or, worse still, when they reduce the quality of those assessments– then they constitute a bad education.

American privacy law, which is principally a mandated-disclosure regime, imposes a bad education on consumers. This Article proposes a theory for differentiating valuable disclosures from wasteful and harmful ones. Valuable disclosures provide notice about material attributes without inducing an overreaction. After validating the theory in an experimental setting using disclosures about health risks, moral risks, and pseudoscience, we apply the model to four distinct forms of privacy-invasive practices. We find that the disclosures required by regulators are usually wasteful and may cause consumers to overreact. This is the first study to compare disclosures about privacy practices to disclosures about other types of attributes. It raises, for the first time, a troubling insight: if consumer law were guided by the same justifications as our privacy law, it would have to mandate disclosures about GMOs, animal testing, and an unlimited range of other attributes that produce visceral responses.

* Mike Hintze, In Defense of the Long Privacy Statement, Md. L. Rev.

* CouponCabin LLC v. Savings.com, Inc., 2017 WL 83337 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 10, 2017): In a scraping case, denying a defendant’s judgment on the pleadings even though it remains unclear how the defendant got any notice from the plaintiff. Prior blog post.

* Bob Sullivan: CFPB finally issues ban on class-action waivers; but with bureau’s future uncertain, will it stick?

July 29th 2017 Marketing

1H 2017 Quick Links, Part 1 (Trademarks, Keyword Ads)

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Trademark

* Viacom Int’l Inc v. IJR Capital Investments LLC, 2017 WL 107141 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2017): “Because “The Krusty Krab” is a recurring element of the “SpongeBob SquarePants” show, the court finds that the mark is eligible for trademark protection.” Yet Viacom apparently never marketed any actual goods or services under the “Krusty Krab” mark. Viacom did market goods and services associated with the SpongeBob Squarepants marks, but this seems like an incorrect ruling if Krusty Krabb was never promoted separately.

*  In re Driven Innovations, Inc., 2017 WL 33574 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2017): “Considering DOTBLOG as a single mark, the evidence of the definitions and the proposed existence of “.blog” generic top-level domains merely shows, at most, that the mark DOTBLOG likely would have some relation to online blogs. Mere relation, however, does not mean that a mark is descriptive.”

* Kassa v. Detroit Metro Convention & Visitors Bureau,  2017 WL 117534 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 2017)

In his complaint, he alleges that the Detroit Metro Convention & Visitors Bureau (the “Bureau”) and the Detroit Sports Commission (the “Commission”) infringed on his trademark by using the phrase “Welcome to the D” on banners and signs hung around Detroit “to promote” the 2012 World Series and again for the 2015 Volleyball Open National Championships. This alleged infringement, he claims, caused confusion to customers and diluted the distinctiveness of his trademark. Applying our case law, the district court found that the Bureau and the Commission did not use the phrase in a trademark way, because it was a greeting and because “The D” is a common nickname for Detroit. The district court correctly applied the law, so we affirm its order.

*  Prominent GmbH v. Prominent Systems, Inc., 2017 WL 1316362 (W.D. Pa. April 10, 2017):

Plaintiffs attempt to get around this infirmity by arguing that Defendants employ metatags and search engine optimization techniques to specifically target Pennsylvania consumers searching for PROMINENT on Google or other search engines to lure them to Defendants’ websites. However, Liedtke’s declaration and supporting documentation do not show that the use of metatags and search engine optimization techniques specifically targeted Pennsylvania consumers. Rather, Liedtke states that metatags are designed to induce internet search engines to display a website more prominently than others. This statement only supports the conclusion that any consumers (nationally or globally) who enter a search inquiry containing the word “PROMINENT” will likely see Defendants’ websites listed more prominently in their search results. Exhibit 3 to Liedtke’s declaration does not support the conclusion that the use of metatags targets consumers in Pennsylvania.

* Reuters: Amazon to expand counterfeit removal program in overture to sellers

* Bloomberg: EBay Gets Hands-On in Fighting Fake Handbags With New Service. “EBay Inc. will begin authenticating luxury handbags, footwear and other commonly counterfeited fashion items this year, looking to gain an edge as shoppers become more wary of the abundance of fake goods posted to online marketplaces. The company will use a network of brand experts to verify that a Chanel handbag listed on the marketplace, for instance, is real. Sellers can pay for the authentication service to win the confidence of shoppers, or shoppers can pay for the service with EBay’s pledge that the sale will be nullified if the item is fake.”

* Reuters: Alibaba accuses IP firms of filing fake counterfeit claims

* Reuters: Grey market has become a necessary evil for luxury watchmakers

* Quartz: A Brooklyn ice cream brand increased sales by 50% after it redesigned its packaging. Trade dress FTW!

* Quartz: The secret taxonomy behind IKEA’s product names, from Billy to Poäng

Keyword Advertising

* American Cruise Lines, Inc v. HMS American Queen Steamboat Co. LLC, 2016 WL 7410781 (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2016):

Defendants’ allegation that Plaintiff used paid search terms, if proven to be true, would still fall short of establishing that Plaintiff deliberately and blatantly represented its services as coming from Defendants. There is no allegation that Plaintiff used its mark in such a way that suggests, much less represents, that Plaintiff’s services come from Defendants.

* Complaint in Schiff v Exclusive Legal Marketing, 2:17-cv-00237-MHW-KAJ (S.D. Ohio). More lawyers bring trademark and publicity rights lawsuit over keyword ads. See my article on keyword ads and lawyers.

* Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Cannon & Dunphy, 2014 WL 12663385 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 14, 2014) (another latecomer from Westlaw). Keyword advertising defendant denied insurer’s duty to defend because the plaintiff didn’t seek compensatory damages and the insurance policy only covered “damages.” Furthermore:

Even if the underlying complaint could be considered a suit for damages because of an advertising injury, Travelers did not breach its duty to defend because the complaint falls within the “Knowing Violation” exclusion.4 This exclusion provides that there is no coverage for an advertising injury “caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict ‘personal injury’ or ‘advertising injury.’ ” The underlying complaint alleges that Cannon & Dunphy’s actions were intentional, with the specific purpose of using the names Habush and Rottier for Cannon & Dunphy’s “benefit and commercial gain.” Thus, the exclusion applies because Cannon & Dunphy was attempting to lure potential customers from Habush Habush and Rottier.

Prior blog post. Related article.

Personal Names

* Cracked: How Legally Changing My Name To ‘Spider Mann’ Ruined My Life

* WSJ: It’s Really Hard to Fill in a Web Form When Your Name Is Mr. Sample

July 16th 2017 Marketing

5 Effective Tips for Building Your Brand Using Instagram

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As proven by their 700 million monthly active users, Instagram is a popular social media platform for millennials. Because of their massive growth, wide reach, and strong influence over consumers, it is hard for any brand to ignore their power. However, launching a company on Instagram may not be as easy. If you are not that familiar with how it works, you might struggle to get a loyal following established. Consider the following tips to help you build your brand on Instagram.

5 Tips for Building Your Brand With Instagram

1. Take Advantage of the Bio SectionImage result for instagram bio link

There is only one place on Instagram where you can place clickable links—the bio section under your account name located at the top of your page. First, make an informative and interesting bio that can hook followers. Then, promote your brand and boost traffic to your website, online store, or blog by including a link to your targeted landing page. You can also change the link regularly to update your followers about your latest campaign, product launch, event sale, and other promotions.

2. Focus on Content Creation

On Instagram, the two elements you need to focus on are visuals and engaging text. Your content should not only resonate with your followers but also drive them to interact. It is necessary to create high-quality content that is deserving of your audience’s time. As you are about to upload a photo, ask yourself first whether it tells a story or elicits an emotion. An emotional connection can attract and retain the most valuable customers.

Post images outside of your own products once in awhile. Something entertaining, inspirational, or useful. Let your followers know that there is a real person behind that account. To complete your post, make sure to include an engaging caption. It can be a compelling question, a motivational quote, or a powerful statement.

Related image

3. Collect & Use the Right Hashtags

Hashtags make it easy for Instagram users to find posts by searching for specific terms. Use the right words to get your brand noticed. You might even gain new followers and be discovered in the process. Although Instagram allows up to 30 hashtags per post, you should aim to use much less than that. Posts with more than five hashtags have significantly lower engagement. Plus, you wouldn’t want to risk coming across as “salesy.” Use relevant hashtags that your brand could use, such as a campaign title, product name, a slogan, or even the location of your store.

 

4. Engage With Your Competitor’s Followers

The great thing about Instagram is that you can stalk your competitors’ profile accounts without them knowing and you get to scan through their followers. Engaging with their audience is actually an effective way to attract new following. People who are following your competitor’s account already carry some level of interest in the products or services you are offering. Start by targeting at least 50 users. The first step is to follow them, then like a picture, and leave a comment on one of their posts. If the response is good, add more.

5. Partner With a Micro-Influencer

Micro-influencers are well-known in the advertising industry for their ability to generate positive word-of-mouthabout the products and services they feature. According to a study, around 82% of consumers would follow a purchase recommendation from a micro-influencer. The idea is to hire an influencer within a category related to your brand in order to promote your product or service. They can also add a strong call to action in the shout-out to follow your account. It is a great way to gain a large number of new followers quickly.

 

Instagram marketing is an art. A brand needs to invest time and attention to establish effective engagement and convert followers into paying customers.  If done strategically, a tremendous potential for your business awaits. Get ready to expand your reach, increase brand awareness, and ultimately improve your company’s revenue.

The post 5 Effective Tips for Building Your Brand Using Instagram appeared first on WebProNews.

June 22nd 2017 Marketing, Social Media

VPPA Still Doesn’t Protect App Downloaders–Perry v. CNN

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IMG_5662Plaintiff sued CNN under the Video Privacy Protection Act, alleging that CNN wrongly disclosed plaintiff’s viewing records without plaintiff’s consent. The allegation is that plaintiff used the CNN app, which records viewing history, and CNN sent this information to Bango, a third party data analytics company. CNN allegedly disclosed to Bango the viewing activity along with the MAC address (a unique string of numbers associated with plaintiff’s device). Bango then allegedly used the information to link the user’s MAC address to other information and built a profile of plaintiff that includes the name, location, phone number, email address, and payment information, combined with the viewing history that CNN disclosed.

Standing: CNN argued that Spokeo v. Robins deprived plaintiff of standing because plaintiff did not allege any harm apart from the wrongful disclosure in question. The court rejects CNN’s reading of Spokeo. In this court’s view, Spokeo recognized that statutory harm alone can suffice where the legislature demonstrates a clear intent to create cognizable injury through the statute. That was the case here. The court cites to the rationale for passing the statute in the first place–the wrongful disclosure of then-nominee Bork’s videotape viewing records. The court also looks to the common law history of privacy torts and notes that in many circumstances, mere disclosure alone, even without misuse of information, is actionable. Thus, plaintiff does not have to show any more injury than wrongful disclosure to have Article III standing.

Whether plaintiff is a subscriber: The second and dispositive question is whether plaintiff is a “subscriber” as defined by the statute. The limited case law on the issue recognizes plaintiff as a subscriber either where the plaintiff pays to obtain the content or where there is some sort of ongoing subscription relationship. Plaintiff initially alleged in district court that he downloaded the free app and this was the extent of his relationship. This was insufficient under another Eleventh Circuit case (Ellis v. Cartoon Network). This time around, plaintiff alleges that he paid for a premium cable package that entitled him to get “premium content” on his devices, and this satisfied the necessary ongoing relationship. The court says this is still insufficient:

[the] ephemeral investment and commitment associated with [plaintiff’s] downloading of the [app,] even with the fact that [plaintiff] has a separate cable . . . subscription that includes CNN content, is simply not enough to consider [plaintiff] a subscriber under Ellis.

Accordingly, the court declines to reach the issue of whether the information disclosed by CNN is “personally identifiable information” under the VPPA.

__

Whether the Court’s ruling in Spokeo v. Robins would push back the wave of impending privacy litigation was an open question following Spokeo. I think this question can be decisively answered in the negative. It’s rare to see a dismissal on standing grounds supported by Spokeo, and most of those cases would have not satisfied standing pre-Spokeo anyway.

As to the court’s reading of the term “subscriber,” there’s a tension there between reading the statute broadly to protect consumers on the one hand, and facilitating crushing privacy lawsuits on the other. There’s also of course the difference between the state of affairs when the statute was passed (e.g., before Netflix) to the changing landscape of content consumption today. You can certainly argue that content nowadays often involves a non-monetary quid pro quo, so looking to whether the consumer pays money is a poor metric. But it’s certainly a bright line. And as this case illustrates, the “ongoing relationship” test spelled out by Ellis and applied here is vague at best.

Ultimately, it’s a loss for the privacy bar, but courts continue to struggle with aspects of the statute to reach this result.

Case citation: Perry v. CNN, No. 16-13031 (11th Cir. Apr. 27, 2017)

Related posts:

Important and Troubling Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) Ruling From First Circuit–Yershov v. Gannett

App Users Aren’t “Subscribers” Under the VPPA–Ellis v. Cartoon Network

9th Circuit Rejects VPPA Claims Against Netflix For Intra-Household Disclosures

Court Rejects VPPA Claim Against Viacom and Google Based on Failure to Disclose Identity

Court Says Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Pursue Failure-to-Purge Claim Under the VPPA – Sterk v. Best Buy

Judge Dismisses Claims Against Pandora for Violating Michigan’s Version of the VPPA – Deacon v. Pandora Media

Ninth Circuit Rejects Video Privacy Protection Act Claims Against Sony

AARP Defeats Lawsuit for Sharing Information With Facebook and Adobe

Lawsuit Fails Over Ridesharing Service’s Disclosures To Its Analytics Service–Garcia v. Zimride

Android ID Isn’t Personally Identifiable Information Under the Video Privacy Protection Act

Minors’ Privacy Claims Against Viacom and Google Over Disclosure of Video Viewing Habits Dismissed

Video Privacy Protection Act Plaintiffs Can Proceed Against Hulu Absent Showing of Actual Injury

Judge Boots Privacy Lawsuit Against Pandora but Plaintiffs Can Replead – Yunker v. Pandora

Split 9th Circuit Panel Approves Facebook Beacon Settlement – Lane v. Facebook

No Privacy Claim Against Netflix for Disclosing Viewing Histories and Instant Queue Titles Through Netflix-Enabled Devices — Mollett v. Netflix

Court Declines to Dismiss Video Privacy Protection Act Claims against Hulu

Granick on CISPA’s Deficiencies (With Some of My Own Comments)

Seventh Circuit: No Private Cause of Action Under the Video Privacy Protection Act for Failure to Purge Information–Sterk v. Redbox

Jan.-Feb. 2012 Quick Links, Part 6 (Privacy and more)

Redbox Can be Liable Under the Video Privacy Protection Act for Failure to Purge Video Rental Records — Sterk v. Redbox

Beacon Class Action Settlement Approved — Lane v. Facebook

May 2nd 2017 Marketing

Catching Up On Some Recent Click Fraud Rulings

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After all of the excitement over click fraud a decade ago, we don’t often see click fraud cases any more. However, just in the past couple months I’ve seen 3 rulings that I wanted to share with you.

Wickfire, LLC v. Woodruff, 2017 WL 1149075 (W.D. Tex. March 23, 2017). The complaint.

This case involves click fraud and other online marketing shenanigans. It leads to a major damages award for the plaintiff. The parties are both SEMs. Wickfire claimed that TriMax “(1) placed fraudulent advertisements on Google AdWords that falsely designated Wickfire as their origin in violation of the Lanham Act, and (2) engaged in “click fraud” and placed fraudulent advertisements to intentionally interfere with Wickfire’s current and prospective contractual and business relationships, and they did so as part of a conspiracy to harm Wickfire.” TriMax made various counterclaims.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. “The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Wickfire, finding Defendants TriMax, Laura Woodruff, WREI, and Josh West (1) misrepresented Wickfire as the source of advertisements by placing advertisements containing identifying information distinctive of Wickfire in a manner that was likely to cause confusion; (2) intentionally interfered with Wickfire’s existing contracts; (3) tortiously interfered with Wickfire’s prospective business relationships; (4) were part of a conspiracy that damaged Wickfire; and (5) acted with malice or gross negligence. The jury awarded Wickfire $2,318,000.00 in compensatory damages as a result of Defendants’ intentional interference with Wickfire’s existing contracts and prospective business relationships.” TriMax’s counterclaims failed.

Regarding click fraud, the court acknowledges the semantic confusion:

Although the witnesses at trial testified to varying definitions of “click fraud,” the parties use the term in their claims to mean the practice where an individual clicks on a competitor’s ad to drive up the competitor’s cost of advertising and prematurely exhaust the budget. Once a competitor’s ads disappeared, the individual committing click fraud can then win the bid.

The court says:

the jury heard evidence Defendants clicked on Wickfire’s online advertisements for 12 to 14 hours a day over a period of months for the sole purpose of forcing Wickfire to pay for the clicks, and this clicking, which ultimately resulted in 4,080 clicks, could have run Wickfire out of business. Moreover, Wickfire has provided sufficient support for the proposition that click fraud is unlawful [citing Findwhat Investor Group v. Findwhat.com, 2011 WL 4506180 (11th Cir. Sept. 30, 2011) and Menagerie v. Citysearch].

TriMax argued in its counterclaims that Wickfire had engaged in predatory bidding. It doesn’t work:

TriMax claims Wickfire manipulated the Google AdWords auction by engaging in “predatory bidding.” Wickfire allegedly did this by (1) running indirect ads below TriMax’s direct ads that linked customers to a website called WebCrawler.com (eventually Wickfire would begin linking these indirect ads to its own website, TheCoupon.co, rather than WebCrawler.com), (2) “plac[ing] exorbitantly high bids on its Webcrawler ads” which caused TriMax’s cost-per-click to “skyrocket,” and (3) once TriMax’s budget was exhausted and its ad campaign paused, Wickfire placed its own direct ads “which easily won the auctions due to the lack of competition from TriMax.” Additionally, in support of its unclean hands defense, TriMax claims Wickfire used tracking identifiers similar to those used by TriMax to make it look like TriMax, not Wickfire, was the predatory bidder.

According to Wickfire, TriMax’s increased costs resulted from its own overbidding, not tortious interference from Wickfire. As Wickfire explains, TriMax alone controls its bids; TriMax has never been charged more than it bid, and this bidding strategy was equally open to TriMax. Wickfire therefore maintains this so-called practice of “predatory bidding” simply constitutes legitimate competition.

The facts in the opinion were a little garbled, so I couldn’t easily tell why TriMax’s predatory bidding claim failed yet Wickfire, which appeared to allege similar conduct, found success. I’m sure there are some key factual differences that persuaded the jury.

There is also some wacky discussion about Wickfire’s unique affiliate tracking code achieving secondary meaning and becoming an enforceable trademark. Ugh.

Satmodo v. Whenever Communications, 2017 WL 1365839 (S.D. Cal. April 14, 2017).

The litigants compete in the satellite phone retailing business. The court suggests that it’s a fiercely competitive business. Both parties engage in search engine marketing. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant deliberately engaged in competitive click fraud to drain its SEM budget. “Plaintiff believes that Defendants are utilizing automated means and rotating through proxy servers in order to avoid detection.” The court discusses several claims:

CFAA 1030(a)(4): “Plaintiff asserts two theories alleging how Defendants acquired improper access: (1) violating the terms and conditions of the search engine’s advertising contracts, and (2) accessing Plaintiff’s website after Plaintiff blocked various IP addresses and asked Defendants to cease.” The court rejects the TOS prong per Power Ventures and Nosal, but the C&D letter was good enough to delimit access.

Still, the CFAA claim gets tossed because the plaintiff didn’t adequately show how the defendant accessed its computers. In a footnote, the court explains “Plaintiff’s opposition explains that clicking on the advertisements on the search engines resulted in Defendants being redirected to Plaintiff’s website, servers, and computers. However, Plaintiff fails to allege this information in its complaint.” The Cal. Penal Code 502 claim fails for the same reason.

CFAA 1030(a)(5): the court says the plaintiff didn’t show how “their data was destroyed, their computer system was harmed, or there was an inability to access their own computer data.”

California UCL: “The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint focuses on Defendants’ alleged click fraud scheme, which takes Plaintiff, “one of its main competitors, out of the marketplace for a period of time, all to the Defendants’ benefit.” These allegations, taken as true, allege unfair conduct that violates the spirit of antitrust laws and significantly threatens competition.”

Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. “Plaintiff does not allege any facts that show the existence of any specific economic relationship with identifiable third parties.”

In contrast to the Wickfire case, this plaintiff seems to be struggling to find a workable theory to challenge competitive click fraud.

Havensight Capital LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 2017 WL 1507491 (Cal. Ct. App. April 27, 2017):

On several occasions, plaintiff purchased online ads for its business on the Facebook social networking site in order to gain website visits to a single specified website address. According to plaintiff, Facebook has a tool called Ads Manager that shows customers the number of website clicks generated from the ads customers place with it. Google has a similar tool called Google Analytics, which tracks and reports website traffic. After comparing data from Facebook’s Ads Manager to similar data from Google Analytics, plaintiff observed that Ads Manager tallied a visit count to its website that was 30 percent higher than that shown by the Google Analytics data, even though the Google tool measures total visits, not just visits from Facebook, as does Ads Manager. From this disparity, plaintiff asserts defendant is deliberately over-inflating the amount of visits generated from its site. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant has charged it varying amounts per click. For example, the charges ranged from 67 cents per click to 25 cents per click on two different days in 2015. Plaintiff asserts defendant’s conduct resulted in the denial of multiple venture capital funding requests.

The appeals court upholds a dismissal of the lawsuit.

Bonus Track #1: Tropical Sails Corp. v. Yext, Inc., 2017 WL 1048086 (SDNY March 17, 2017)

Yext provides the “PowerListings” service, which enables “subscribers to track their business listing information (e.g., business name, address, and telephone number) across a number of online business directories—or internet Yellow Pages—that partner with Yext.” To drum up business, Yext offers prospective customers a free way to check how their listings are faring on existing sites. When using this tool, Yext presents a list of “Location Data Errors Detected.” The court explains:

For customers not already subscribed to Yext’s PowerListings service, the PowerListings scan reported “not standing out” under the “Special Offer” column and “unverified listing” under the “Status” column for every single online directory in the list. In addition to totaling any entry missing entirely from a directory and any discrepancy in the business name, address, or telephone number as an error, the PowerListings scan counted each “not standing out” and “unverified listing” as an error. The PowerListings scan contained between forty and sixty online directories, meaning that for all customers not subscribed to PowerListings at the time they ran the PowerListings scan, by design, the scan showed at least eighty to 120 errors.

The plaintiff, Tropical Sails, used this scanning tool and unsuccessfully tried to update the business listings manually to reduce the Yext-reported errors. Eventually it decided to subscribe to Yext after a salesperson called. The arrangement was not successful: “the PowerListings service generated ‘zero calls, zero inquiries, or zero leads from all these directories.’” Tropical Sails didn’t renew the subscription, and then it sued Yext (in a putative class action) for fraud/fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and violations of N.Y. General Business Law §§ 349-50.

The court says that Tropical Sails qualifies for most elements of class formation, except that individual questions of fact predominate. Still, the outcome isn’t all good news for Yext. The court denies Yext’s summary judgment to dismiss Tropical Sails’ individual claim, plus it’s never good when a customer reports “zero calls, zero inquiries, or zero leads.” I know business directory listings are popular tools among online marketers because they are easy things to measure (see, e.g., the Kent report in the Larsen v. Larson case I blogged about), but I routinely wonder how much traffic these business directories actually get (other than from SEMs checking their positioning) and if/when it’s worth businesses investing in improving their business directory exposure.

Bonus Track #2: MacFarland v. Le-Vel Brands LLC, 2017 WL 1089684 (Tex. Ct. App. March 23, 2017)

MacFarland runs the Lazy Man and Money website, allegedly with 4M visitors (total? per month? per day?). He posted an article “Is Le-Vel Thrive aScam?” Le-Vel is a multi-level marketer. It sent a demand letter claiming defamation. MacFarland edited the letter but didn’t remove it. At issue is whether MacFarland qualifies for Texas’ anti-SLAPP law. The trial court ruled against MacFarland, but the appellate court easily reverses on all points and gives MacFarland the win and his attorneys’ fees. Let’s hear it for robust anti-SLAPP laws!

More Click Fraud Posts

* Facebook Beats Class Certification in Click Fraud Case
* Google Sued for Click Fraud for the First Time in Years–123 Lock and Key v. Google
* Facebook Gets Partial Win in Click Fraud Lawsuit
* Citysearch Click Fraud Class Certified–Menagerie v. Citysearch
* Facebook Sued for Click Fraud–RootZoo v. Facebook
* Securities Fraud Case Premised on Click Fraud Allegations Dismissed–Brodsky v. Yahoo
* Lambotte’s Click Fraud Lawsuit Against IAC Survives Motion to Dismiss
* Stockholder Derivative Action Against Yahoo Based on Click Fraud Rebuffed–Brodsky v. Yahoo
* Citysearch Sued for Click Fraud–Lambotte v. IAC
* Click Fraud Talk at SMX West
* Lead Fraud (A Cousin of Click Fraud)–NetQuote v. Byrd
* Click Fraud Resources
* Miva Securities Litigation Rejects Most Click Fraud/Syndication Fraud Claims
* Click Fraud Lawsuit Survives Motion to Dismiss–Payday Advance v. FindWhat
* Click Fraud Presentation
* Google Click Fraud Settlement Approved
* Yahoo Click Fraud Settlement Preliminary Approval
* Google Click Fraud Report
* AIT Click Fraud Lawsuit Stayed
* Lane’s Gifts Click Fraud Lawsuit Near Settlement
* Lane’s Gifts Click Fraud Lawsuit Back to State Court
* Lane’s Gift Click Fraud Complaint
* Click Fraud Lawsuit–Click Defense v. Google
* Update on Click Fraud Lawsuit
* Lostclicks.com and Click Fraud

May 2nd 2017 Marketing

A Complaint’s Silence About Section 230 Helps It Survive Judgment on the Pleadings–Moretti v. Hertz

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This is a class action lawsuit against car rental companies for an alleged “currency exchange rate scam.” Allegedly, the rental car companies quote foreign rentals in dollars but then actually charge customers in the local currency at an inflated exchange rate. Also, the rental car companies allegedly didn’t disclose that liability insurance was mandatory in some places.

This post focuses on Hotwire’s liability as an online travel agency, though the opinion never uses that term. The allegations against Hotwire include that “Hotwire continued to [publish misleading information] despite consumer complaints and Hotwire’s knowledge of the information’s fraudulent content….Hotwire [w]as a willing and ratifying participant in this arrangement, and… Hotwire ‘directly profit[s]’ from the scheme.”

Hotwire moved for judgment on the pleadings on Section 230 grounds. We know Section 230 can be resolved via a judgment on the pleadings because the seminal Zeran case ruled on that basis. The court also cites the Obado and DiMeo Third Circuit rulings and the Kabbaj ruling from the District of Delaware, all Section 230 12(b)(6) dismissals. In a footnote, the court adds additional citations that Section 230 is an immunity from suit, including the Nemet Chevrolet, MA v. Village Voice, Evans v. HP and Goddard v. Google cases. Given this stack of precedents, you’d think Hotwire was in good shape.

Here, the plaintiffs didn’t make allegations in the complaint that Hotwire is disqualified from Section 230, i.e., the complaint did not anticipatorily rebut Hotwire’s Section 230’s defense. The court treats Section 230 as an affirmative defense, so the complaint’s silence about Section 230 is OK:

Taking the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, there is no basis in the Complaint from which the Court could conclude that Hotwire did not function as an ICP and did not contribute materially to the alleged misrepresentations.

The court summarizes:

Plaintiff’s allegations are such that there is, based solely on the face of the Complaint, a factual dispute as to the nature and degree of Hotwire’s involvement in the allegedly misleading statement. Under the circumstances here, the Court cannot treat the Complaint’s silence as to whether Hotwire materially contributed to the false statement as an affirmative allegation that Hotwire did not do so.

In support of rejecting Section 230 on a motion to dismiss, the court cites Swift v. Zynga, Chang v. Wozo, Cybersitter v. Google, and Perfect 10 v. Google (the 2006 district court ruling).

There are several moving parts to the court’s double-negative treatment of this issue. First, as the court acknowledges, many other courts have said Section 230 isn’t an affirmative defense; it’s an immunity from liability, in which case the plaintiff bears the pleading burden. Second, even if Section 230 is an affirmative defense, the court doesn’t distinguish between a 12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Hotwire’s answer and supporting filings may be sufficient to establish the prima facie elements of the affirmative defense, shifting the burden back onto the plaintiff to rebut the defense or lose. Unfortunately, the way the court phrased its discussion, it implies that a plaintiff’s complaint will survive a judgment on the pleadings so long as it’s murky and ambiguous enough that the court can’t tell whether or not Section 230 might apply. If that’s the court’s true holding, it would reward poor pleading by the plaintiffs and extend–at substantial cost to the parties–cases that may ultimately be governed by Section 230.

Apparently the judge was partially influenced by unspecified representations of plaintiffs’ counsel during oral arguments that they had facts disqualifying Hotwire from Section 230’s coverage. To get those facts into the pleadings, the court requires the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint “to include any specifics which are in his possession that help to show why Plaintiff believes Hotwire is not immune.” I don’t recall seeing a court require an amended complaint in a ruling the plaintiffs won, but it’s a logical step to get the salient facts into the record so Hotwire can contest them.

The court doesn’t get into Section 230’s substantive standards in much detail. In a footnote, the court cryptically suggests that “whether Hotwire is an ICP (and therefore not entitled to Section 230 immunity) will depend on whether there is a sufficient nexus between Hotwire’s conduct and the allegedly misleading nature of the information supplied by Hertz Defendants and displayed on Hotwire’s site.” The court doesn’t address whether Hotwire functions as the retailer or a travel agent rather than just an ad-supported content publisher, but that issue may come up.

BONUS RANT: The case doesn’t directly implicate resort fees, though the allegedly undisclosed mandatory obligation to procure liability insurance is analogous. Any mandatory fee not disclosed as part of the base price is BOGUS. Worse, the FTC knows it’s bogus yet continues to do nothing. I doubt this case will have any implications for resort fees, but if this case can finally stop hotels from imposing resort fees, I’m all for it.

Case citation: Moretti v. The Hertz Corp., 2017 WL 1032783 (D. Del. March 17, 2017). I previously blogged the venue selection ruling in this case.

March 31st 2017 Marketing

Trademark Lawsuit Claiming Organic Search Results Create Initial Interest Confusion Falls Apart–Larsen v. Larson

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Disclosure note: I provided an expert report in this now-dismissed case, so you might consider my comments to be advocacy. I’ll explain my expert role in a bit.

The Court Opinion

Susan Larsen practices business law in the Denver, Colorado metro area under the name Larsen Law Offices. She claims she’s been using the name since 2003, though she did not register the name as a trademark (and would need to address the obvious secondary meaning issues to do so). David Larson practices estate planning law (and more) in the Denver metro area as well. In 2013, Larson set up a website at the domain name davidlarsonlawoffice.com, and he used the domain name larsonlawoffice.com starting in 2016. In 2016, Larsen sued Larson for trademark infringement, ACPA and more. After the complaint, Larson’s website removed references to Larson Law Offices, adopting the name David M. Larson, PLLC. Larson partially moved to dismiss.

Cybersquatting. The court says “Plaintiff does not allege that Mr. Larson had actual knowledge of Larsen Law Offices’ existence in 2013, or that he has ever conducted a Google search that returned plaintiff’s name.” Further (cites omitted):

davidlarsonlawoffice.com and larsonlawoffice.com both consist of a descriptive component (“law office”) and Mr. Larson’s name. And Mr. Larson has apparently used these marks for years in connection with his legitimate business. Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that Mr. Larson has offered to sell these websites to plaintiff for profit or that he falsified registration information in obtaining the domain names.

The court grants the motion to dismiss the ACPA claim.

Protective order. Larson sought a protective order against discovery into his financial affairs. In theory, such information would be relevant to damages. The judge isn’t willing to allow it (cites omitted):

I am not going to let plaintiff go digging in the books of what plaintiff asserts is a competitor when its case is hanging by a thread….

Plaintiff has already obtained most of the relief it seeks: Mr. Larson has changed his business’s name and removed all potentially infringing language from his websites. But plaintiff forges ahead simply because defendants continue to use the websites davidlarsonlawoffice.com and larsonlawoffice.com. The former domain name uses Mr. David Larson’s first and last name, casting doubt on the claim that this website could be confused with the site for Ms. Susan Larsen’s firm. And plaintiff did not notice this website for the first three years of the site’s existence, suggesting that Mr. Larson’s legitimate business activities did not actually harm plaintiff. As for the latter domain name, plaintiff’s exhibit shows that while Mr. Larson began using this website in 2016, the site has been used by others since 2001, if not earlier—at least two years before Larsen Law Offices was formed. Furthermore, plaintiff uses the plural “offices” in its name and website despite having only one office, possibly because larsenlawoffice.com is used by yet another attorney whose last name is Larsen. Thus, plaintiff might have some issues of its own.

To sidestep the discovery request, the court bifurcates liability and damages:

I cannot say that it is completely inconceivable that plaintiff could prevail in the end. However, plaintiff is going to have to show me that defendant is liable for disgorgement of profits before his books become fair game.

The plaintiff internalized the judge’s doubts about the case. The parties settled a week later, the plaintiff dismissed the case, and she wrote a check to the defendant.

My Role as an Expert

Nowadays, I’m careful about undertaking new outside professional activities because of my personal obligations, but I couldn’t say no here. The plaintiff’s trademark claim basically asserted that Larson’s website appearing in search results for “Larsen Law Offices” created initial interest confusion. Regular readers know how I feel about the initial interest confusion doctrine (hint: I think it’s bullshit), and I couldn’t believe that a putative trademark owner (of a dubious mark, no less) in 2017 was willing to go to court claiming that organic search results create initial interest confusion. Recall my tip to plaintiffs from yesterday: “If success in your case depends on establishing initial interest confusion, DON’T BRING THE CASE.” So I decided I couldn’t watch this case from the sidelines.

To support the initial interest confusion claim, the plaintiff procured an expert report from a technologist, Peter Kent. Read his report. I was asked to prepare a report rebutting Kent’s report (rather than prepare my own standalone expert report). Read my rebuttal report. As you know, expert reports become publicly available relatively rarely, but both reports were filed in PACER without redactions, so I’m sharing them here. As much as was possible within the scope of a rebuttal report, my expert report lays out some of my latest thinking about the initial interest confusion doctrine (especially as applied to organic search results), so I encourage you to take a look.

Case citation: Larsen Law Offices v. David Larson, 2017 WL 1131885 (D. Colo. Mar. 14, 2017). The complaint.

March 29th 2017 Marketing

Your Periodic Reminder That Initial Interest Confusion Lawsuits Are Stupid–Epic v. YourCareUniverse

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grumpy catThe plaintiff has a registered trademark for “CARE EVERYWHERE” for B2B healthcare software. The defendant, YourCareUniverse, also makes healthcare software. It extended its brand to include “YOURCAREEVERYWHERE” and launched a public-facing patient healthcare portal under the extended brand. The plaintiff sued for trademark infringement. The court runs through the standard multi-factor likelihood of consumer confusion test and finds most factors favor the defendant.

That should end the case, but no. As we see far too often with weak marks and weak infringement cases, “Epic attempts to save its claims by relying on the doctrine of ‘initial interest confusion.’” In response, the court issues a major burn: “The facts in this case bear no similarity to those in which a court accepted a theory of initial interest confusion as plausible.”

We still don’t have a consistent (or coherent) definition of initial interest confusion. This court applies the Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, which has historically provided a narrow scope for initial interest confusion. The court defines it as when “the defendant ‘lur[es] potential customers away from [the plaintiff] by initially passing off its goods [or services] as those of the [plaintiff’s] even if confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.’…The Seventh Circuit has summarized initial interest confusion as a “bait and switch” technique, in which a competitor will try to ‘get its foot in the door’ and affect a purchasing decision by confusing the consumer.”

All of Epic’s arguments fail:

* There is no evidence of luring: “defendants have provided compelling evidence that their adoption of the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark had nothing to do with Epic and Epic has presented no evidence that defendants have attempted to use their mark to lure any customers away from Epic.”
* There is no risk of diversion because “the purchasing decisions at issue in this case involve sophisticated consumers making expensive purchases often over a long period of time after acquiring much information….Epic has not articulated any plausible scenario under which a potential customer could be confused by defendants’ mark long enough to have any influence on a purchasing decision.”
* “Epic has presented no evidence that internet searches will produce misleading results”
* Any searchers will figure out the differences between the two enterprises: “defendants market YOURCAREEVERYWHERE along with other YourCareUniverse products and services and that it is generally clear from the context of the YOURCAREEVERYWHERE mark that defendants are the source”

The court summarizes: “‘[I]nitial interest confusion is not assumed and must be proven by the evidence.’…Particularly when one considers all the factors that would diminish the likelihood of initial interest confusion in this case, Epic’s failure to clearly articulate any likely scenario under which a customer would be confused is fatal to its claims.”

So this is the part of the blog post where I rehash some of my many objections to the initial interest confusion doctrine. As this case shows, the doctrine is often relied upon by plaintiffs as a last ditch tool to prop up their cases; the doctrine gives plaintiffs false hope and encourages them to bring low-merit or meritless enforcement actions; and it’s costly to adjudicate the doctrine (this case is up to PACER entry #234), *especially* if it doesn’t change the result. We have seen very few successful assertions of the doctrine in the past half-decade-plus, suggesting that the doctrine has become mostly theoretical, not actually a common law doctrine that works in court. What will it take to wipe the doctrine out of existence entirely, rather than letting it continue to waste so much time and money?

I’ll close with a free tip for trademark owners. If success in your case depends on establishing initial interest confusion, DON’T BRING THE CASE.

Case citation: Epic Systems Corp. v. YourCareUniverse, Inc., 2017 WL 1093292 (W.D. Wis. March 22, 2017)

March 28th 2017 Marketing

Retailer’s TOS Fails, But New Jersey Warranty Notice Claim Loses Anyway

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Screen Shot 2017-03-23 at 3.51.22 PMPlaintiff alleges that she purchased a cosmetic product from Lush Internet. While she did not allege anything was wrong with the product and does not appear to have any other qualms with the transaction itself, she alleged that Lush’s terms of service contains provisions that conflicted with New Jersey’s Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA). Specifically, she argued that Lush’s Terms of Service violated TCCWNA because it disclaimed all liability, absolved Lush of its duty to protect customers from harm, and limited consumers’ rights under product liability law and the UCC.

Lush moved to compel arbitration and also moved to dismiss.

Arbitration: Plaintiff argued that:

because the Terms of Use are hidden in an inconspicuous hyperlink at the bottom of Defendant’s homepage, and because Lush’s website does not require users to “take affirmative action to manifest their assent” to the Terms of Use, the agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable as against her.

The court focuses on reasonable notice and whether the website terms were conspicuously displayed to the consumer. The court concludes that the “design and content” of the website did not amount to clear display, so a reasonably prudent user would not be on notice (citing Nguyen; Specht; Zappos; Hines). The court also notes that Lush did not require users to assent to the terms:

[t]he purchase can readily be completed without the user viewing the terms which relinquish important and customary rights . . . . Without viewing, the user can have no knowledge of the terms, including these waivers.

The court further notes that while the site admonishes users to read the terms, this admonition is not on the home page.

Screen Shot 2017-03-23 at 3.53.23 PMThe Merits: Turning to the plaintiff’s qualms with the Terms of Use, the court notes that the plaintiff takes contradictory positions. On the one hand, she says she never read and agreed to the terms, but on the other she is complaining about provisions in the terms. The court looks at the definition of “consumer” and says it’s not clear whether the statute covers just buyers who purchase household items or something broader.

Setting this aside, the court says plaintiff lacks standing under Spokeo. The Supreme Court in Spokeo said that plaintiffs who allege “bare procedural violations” lack standing. And that was the case here:

Here, because Plaintiff did not assent to the Terms of Use, they simply do not bind her as a matter of contract law. Because Plaintiff does not seek to vindicate any underlying rights secured by the TCCWNA – i.e. she is seeking only to bring the Terms of Use into accord with what she believes New Jersey law requires, not to actually bring a suit or recover damages which she believes are unlawfully barred by the Terms of Use – she does not have standing to sue. Moreover, because the Terms of Use were not displayed to her, she cannot claim harm from their existence in a hidden corner of the Lush website. Based upon the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the harm that Plaintiff has suffered from the allegedly unlawful limitations of liability in the Terms of Use is metaphysical at best. Her strongest allegation of harm is that she was present and made a purchase on a website that, unbeknownst to her, had terms that she now claims are objectionable under the TWCCNA.

The court also reiterates that a plaintiff who argues she has not read and is not bound by terms cannot then complain about provisions in those terms.

__

Ouch. Lush’s terms of service implementation leaves a lot to be desired. As we’ve noted countless times on the blog, it’s trivially easy to implement an enforceable online agreement. Although the court’s order does not include screenshots of Lush’s implementation, I’ve included a few screenshots of its current implementation, which appears to be the same as it was in 2016 (the year of the lawsuit).

Notwithstanding the Terms of Service snafu, the court brushes aside what is an obviously flawed lawsuit. There have been a spate of these lawsuits targeting the purported noncompliance with the New Jersey statute by website terms, but they don’t appear to be getting much traction. The Spokeo ruling was equivocal at best, but the “bare procedural violation” language was a bone to defendants. This is a good example of how it can come into play.

Case citation: Hite v. Lush Internet, 2017 U.S. Dist LEXIS 40949 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 2017)

Related posts:

Anarchy Has Ensued In Courts’ Handling of Online Contract Formation (Round Up Post)

Courts Approve Terms of Service-Based Arbitration Clauses for Uber and Groupon

“Modified Clickwrap” Upheld In Court–Moule v. UPS

Evidentiary Failings Undermine Arbitration Clauses in Online Terms

Court Enforces Arbitration Clause in Amazon’s Terms of Service–Fagerstrom v. Amazon

‘Flash Sale’ Website Defeats Class Action Claim With Mandatory Arbitration Clause–Starke v. Gilt

Some Thoughts On General Mills’ Move To Mandate Arbitration And Waive Class Actions

Second Circuit Says Arbitration Clause in Terms Emailed After-the-Fact Not Enforceable – Schnabel v. Trilegiant

Users Can’t Sue Sony for Changing Online Terms to Require Arbitration – Fineman v. Sony Network Entertainment

Qwest Gets Mixed Rulings on Contract Arbitration Issue—Grosvenor v. Qwest & Vernon v. Qwest

Zynga Wins Arbitration Ruling on “Special Offer” Class Claims Based on Concepcion — Swift v. Zynga

“Modified Clickwrap” Upheld In Court–Moule v. UPS

Facebook Gets Bad Ruling In Face-Scanning Privacy Case–In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation

Defective Call-to-Action Dooms Online Contract Formation–Sgouros v. TransUnion

Court Rejects “Browsewrap.” Is That Surprising?–Long v. ProFlowers

Telephony Provider Didn’t Properly Form a “Telephone-Wrap” Contract–James v. Global Tel*Link

2H 2015 Quick Links, Part 7 (Marketing, Advertising, E-Commerce)

Second Circuit Enforces Terms Hyperlinked In Confirmation Email–Starkey v. G Adventures

If You’re Going To Incorporate Online T&Cs Into a Printed Contract, Do It Right–Holdbrook v. PCS

Clickthrough Agreement Upheld–Whitt v. Prosper

Online Magazine Gets Section 230 Protection For Third Party Article–AdvanFort v. International Registries

The “Browsewrap”/”Clickwrap” Distinction Is Falling Apart

Safeway Can’t Unilaterally Modify Online Terms Without Notice

March 25th 2017 Marketing

Would you like to Brand Like Amazon? Even a Lemonade Stand Can Do It

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Brand Like Amazon preview coverSome of you might have seen through our social media channels that Jeffrey and I have been working on a new book with our friend and mentor Roy H Williams. We have been sharing a new chapter every week. This Monday we will release Chapter 11. The book has only 12 chapters.

If you would like to be among the first to read the book head over to BrandLikeAmazon.com. If you subscribe you will receive by email a PDF of the first 3 chapters and then you will receive a new chapter every 2 days. Do not miss chapter 10 
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